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ABSTRACT
This study investigates food scandals and the role of government in corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the food
industry and explores strategies for the Chinese government to tackle the food safety problems that abound in China.
Based on the theoretical discussion of four types of CSR and the empirical evidence from four case studies, we argue
that government influence on CSR in the food industry is determined by the intensity and salience of its own behavior
and actions including regulations. We further believe that a balanced CSR strategy covering economic, legal, ethical
and philanthropic considerations would work best for China. Our contributions include extending the CSR literature to
the food industry and emerging economies like China and recognizing the distinctive role the government plays in the
food industry. In addition, we provide a timely guide to establishing a food safety system in China.
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, China, Food Safety, Emerging Market

1. Introduction
Food safety is an issue that remains unresolved in both
the developed and developing world. Barely having
recovered from the shock of “mad cow disease” emanating from the UK in the 1990s, the 2008 “tainted
milk” crisis in China serves as a reminder that the
problem of food safety has not been contained or adequately addressed. The World Health Organization [1]
reports a rise of 30 percent in the number of people in
developed countries who become ill from foodborne
diseases each year. Smith and Riethmuller [2–4] provide numerous other examples that show foodborne
diseases do not discriminate between rich and poor
countries with many cases having occurred in Industrialized economies: these range from Japan’s 1996
radish sprouts food poisoning incident that resulted in
10 deaths and 9,000 people being ill, to the “Arnotts
Biscuits poisoning, the Australian peanut paste products
affected by salmonella bacteria and the Jack in the Box
contaminated beef incident in the USA”. So why is food
safety still a problem, and a growing problem at that, in
the world today?
Apart from the food safety systems still being a “work
in progress ” irrespective of which country one wishes to
consider [5], Riethmuller and Morison [6] have identified
at least three reasons for the growing importance
Copyright © 2009 SciRes

of food safety issues. The first concerns changes in food
consumption patterns. People are eating out more, resulting in greater consumer awareness of hygiene. Second, manufactured food products and prepared meals are
available through supermarkets and other food outlets, so
that the onus is on these food retailers to ensure hygiene
standards are adhered to. Third, food safety has become a
notable non-tariff barrier in international trade. There are
numerous examples of developing nations accusing developed ones of using food safety as a protectionist
measure for domestic industry rather than for genuine
safety concerns (see, for example, [7,8]).
In view of these global developments the question of
who is responsible for food safety arises. As consumers
lack the scientific and infrastructural capacity to evaluate
food risk, it is incumbent on the food industry to act with
both integrity and within the legal guidelines, and for
governments to provide those guidelines and enforce
them for the consumer’s protection [9].
This article will survey how governments in the
United States, the European Union and Australasia regulate the food industry and influence the corporate social
responsibility (CSR) behavior of companies—and even
the official world of governmental authorities at home
and abroad-by examining the relevant characteristics of
iB
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their food safety systems. We argue that government
influence on CSR in the food industry is determined by
the intensity and salience of its own behavior and actions
including regulations. The case studies have been selected for the purposes of: a) providing exemplars of
good and innovative international practice in prevention
of food scandals and promoting good practices; and b)
showing how national (USA), supranational-plus-international (EU), and bi-national (Australia and New Zealand)
authorities handle food safety issues. This is of relevance
to China in that it is a unitary state like the USA, but with
a policy of strengthening regional cooperation in East
and Central Asia (multilateral regionalism) as well as an
internal system of provinces and autonomous regions
whose collective population size more than doubles that
of the EU. The PRC also functions as a “one country,
two systems” entity with regard to the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong, Macao and potentially
Taiwan that are different to the provinces and autonomous regions within China. The regulatory authority that
covers Australia and New Zealand, Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ), provides a successfully
functioning model for a regulatory function across two
polities. While this “one system, two countries” is the
reverse of China’s “one country, two systems” formula,
it does show that as the PRC and its Special Administrative Regions continue to converge in terms of a capitalistic system but emphasize politico-social differences
within the One China concept, a common regulatory mechanism across various sectors could be an acceptable
evolutionary move.
The final section of the article profiles China’s
“tainted milk” scandal and draws lessons from the theoretical discussion and case studies for the Chinese government and its food industry. The use of corporate social responsibility as a term applies in China to both private and public sectors as these are often combined, either from the transitional nature of China’s economy
(from command to market) or from an emerging trend
demonstrated by the EU—the Public Private Partnerships
(PPPs). As Howcroft [10] notes:
“Given the scale of the infrastructure and investment
gap that the governments of Europe are facing and the
constraints that they face in developing and financing
their needs, an increased use of PPP approaches is inevitable… [Governments] need to invest in the public sector’s understanding and capability to develop and procure
such projects in ways which maximize the overall benefits to the public sector and the public at large.”
In China the boundaries between the state and business
are neither clear nor necessarily inevitable. CSR must
therefore take a broader view in its purview of application when addressing recommendations for China. Section 2 (What is CSR?), however, will take a theoretical
perspective and focus on business enterprises in order to
Copyright © 2009 SciRes

set the stage for conceptual applications for diverse settings and actors (Section 3–Case Studies), from which
lessons for China (Section 4) may be drawn.

2. Defining Corporate Social Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility varies in meaning and
definitions depending on stakeholder perspectives, be
they employees, consumers, unions, governments, local
communities, shareholders, and executives. Unlike
Friedman [11] who poses the conventional argument
that an organization’s only responsibility was generating profit, and that any activity that detracted from the
goal of profit did not serve the shareholders’ best interests, Carroll [12] goes beyond the economic limits of an
organization’s responsibility to add legal, ethical and
philanthropic dimensions. Societal rules in the form of
laws and regulations had to be followed, but not simply
at the minimum required level. Organizations should
seek to realize higher standards, thereby fulfilling an
ethical responsibility. Moreover, this ethical responsebility feeds into an organization’s philanthropic role of
giving back to the community through donating part of
its profits to the satisfaction of societal needs generally.
Hence, CSR is an encompassing concept covering at
least economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic considerations. We argue that a firm’s disposition towards
CSR is best understood in terms of whether it fulfils
these four types of CSR obligations. For this reason, we
will use this encompassing definition of CSR throughout the article.
Governmental influence on the CSR orientation of
business firms is well recognized, and there is broad
agreement that governments shape the attitude and behavior of company CSR through legislative measures
[13–15]. Recently, scholars have noted broader roles
that governments have played in promoting CSR
[15–19]. Crane and Matten [20] argue that the role of
government has changed from traditional regulator of
dependent firms to that of multi-faceted player in the
face of increased corporate power. We have adopted
Fox et al.’s [15] identification of four key roles for
governments in promoting CSR: mandating, facilitating,
partnering and endorsing. Each of these roles may be
expected to vary in intensity and salience in relation to
company CSR depending on the types of CSR under
study. We believe this definition captures the comprehensive nature of CSR in the food industry. The foremost responsibility of companies engaged in the food
industry is not economic profit in preference to all
else—for if only profits were at stake then the conesquences could be devastating, as China’s “tainted milk”
scandal revealed—but the need to be legally responsible
and obey laws.
iB
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Source: Adopted from Yang and Casali, 2009

Figure 1. Government Influence on Four Types of CSR.

We agree with Yang and Casali [21] that government
influence on CSR is determined by the intensity and salience of its own behavior and actions and have adopted
their two-by-two matrix as a framework to illustrate that
the interaction between the government’s role and CSR is
a function of (direct and indirect) government intervention (see Figure 1).

2.1 Government Influence and CSR
Institutional theories suggest that states develop formal
institutions in the form of laws and regulations to effect
order, reduce uncertainty, and influence social actor behavior in coordinating and promoting economic exchange [22]. Specifically, rational choice institutionalists
argue the behavior and actions of the government are
important to the extent that formal and informal rules,
with their associated monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, result in either enabling or constraining social
actors [23]. On the other hand, firms may take corrective
actions in response or in anticipation of government intervention by choosing to: a) legitimize them, b) avoid
legislation, and/or c) avoid negative publicity. Governments, however, can deploy a preemptive strategy to create an institutional environment capable of fostering a
CSR outlook in business.

2.2 Governmental Role with Four Types of CSR
2.2.1 Government as Mandator (Legal CSR)
Institutional theory holds that firms tend to comply with
government legislation and regulation to legitimize their
behavior in the marketplace [22]. Government can wield
the power of formal institutions-such as legislation, the
judicial system and regulatory agencies-to instill the attitude and shape behavior of company CSR [24]. Government as mandator influences company attitudes to CSR
primarily through a carrot-and-stick strategy of: 1) providing tangible inducements for company resource allocation toward stakeholders and behavior that is socially
Copyright © 2009 SciRes

responsible; and 2) inflicting punishment through penalties if actions are not taken, or standards are contravened
[21].
Government action in the form of legislation has been
argued to be clearly influential in shaping company behavior because it is mandatory [14]. This form of government intervention is direct and its degree can be decisive
from the company perspective. Coercion of this nature
tends to result in CSR policies being internalized to reduce risks and search costs [25], as evidenced in a high
profile US legislative framework-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002-which legislates financial reporting for publicly
traded companies and their auditing firms [26]. A fine of
US$5 million and a jail term of 20 years can be the penalty for CEOs and CFOs failing to certify statements or
signing false statements [24].
Support is also available for the efficacy of regulation
on the emergence of socially responsible behavior with
regard to the environment. Stone, Joseph, and Blodgett
[27] find that the higher the degree of regulation the
greater the likelihood of businesses adopting socially
responsible behaviors. The efficacy of government’s role
as Mandator is also seen in better compliance with the
industry code of conduct [28]. It is argued that one of the
motivating reasons for companies to follow codes of
conduct appears to be a desire to avoid interference or
legislation by government [29–31].
2.2.2 Government as Facilitator (Economic CSR)
Governments can play the role of facilitators to encourage and influence corporations toward being economically responsible. This can be done through government initiatives such as providing guidelines on content,
fiscal and financial mechanisms, and creating framework
conditions [13]. Notable actions toward facilitation
include developing public policies for the training of
skilled workers or establishing specialized government
agencies to oversee these programs. The UK, for examiB

78

Food Safety and the Role of the Government: Implications for CSR Policies in China

ple, implemented Industrial Training Boards and the
Manpower Services Commission to encourage CSR in
the areas of training and work experience opportunities.
Moon [32] found that the Manpower Services Commission led to the Confederation of British Industry forming the Special Programs Unit to ensure large-scale training programs for businesses occurred.
Another mechanism for government as facilitator of
economic CSR is provision of subsidies. Government
subsidies allow firms to defray costs associated with
employment and training schemes, thereby providing
greater incentives to participate in new government
employment programs [13]. Another example is the UK
Department of Trade and Industry’s subsidy of research,
publication and a website for BITC reports. In this way,
government as facilitator produces the kind of influence
that is salient and of direct relevance to the resource
capacity of companies to implement economic CSR.
It is common for governments worldwide to sponsor
excellence in business awards as a mechanism to encourage economic CSR [32]. Another device is the tax
credit designed to bring private enterprise into poorer
areas, as shown by the case of the UK 2002 community
invest tax credit scheme (ibid.). Businesses are demonstrably more likely to participate in economic CSR programs when the government is seen as Facilitator. For
instance, one CSR business association, Business in the
Community with its 700 members, accounts for 20% of
private sector employment (ibid.).
Also of interest is the finding that governments can
exert influence on economic CSR by owning financial
institutions, as in the case of the UK [33]. In most cases,
government influence on economic CSR is direct, but
with low intensity compared to the higher intensity
strategy of government as mandator.
2.2.3 Government as Partner (Philanthropic CSR)
Most governments pursue a less regulatory approach in
relation to philanthropic responsibility. Rather, they seek
to reward good behavior, as shown in the taxation laws of
many countries that allow taxpayers to entirely or partially deduct philanthropic donations from their taxable
income. For example, the Australian Income Tax Assessment Act of 1997 allows deductions for donations to
recognized charities in order to encourage charitable behavior by enterprises. The Australian government benefits through its willingness to partner with business
through philanthropy as this strategy spreads the economic burden of social responsibility across both the
public and private sectors. Indeed, the popularity of this
strategy can be seen through similar approaches taken by
some EU countries [13]. According to a 2005 study conducted by the Australian government in collaboration
with other organizations, $3.3 billion were given by
Copyright © 2009 SciRes

businesses in Australia between the 2003 and 2004 [34].
These businesses represented 67% of the total number of
businesses in Australia (525,900) [34].
Tax deductibility, significant as it is, is not the most
important reason for philanthropic behavior in firms.
Other positive influences encouraging philanthropic responsibility have been found to embrace the following: a
sense of reciprocation, respect for nonprofit organizations, the desire to strengthen the community, and improving the world [34]. In recent years, a phenomenon
called “strategic philanthropy” has emerged. Its exponential growth is indicative of its economic value: strategic philanthropy is viewed as a new and innovative way
to achieve a competitive advantage. It involves a company directly linking its core business-be it product or
service-with charitable activity, for example, by donating
one dollar for each purchase of the company’s product, or
a percentage of the sales profit for a particular day [35].
In this way, a business can simultaneously fulfill its
philanthropic responsibilities, promote its own product or
service, and obtain a tax deduction. This provides a
strong argument for the efficacy of government as partner when it comes to influencing philanthropic CSR indirectly, albeit very strongly [21].
2.2.4 Government as Endorser (Ethical CSR)
As shown in the Figure 1, the government plays an Endorser role when it exercises its influence indirectly and
at low intensity: in other words, when neither legal nor
fiscal strategies can be used as influential means in ethical CSR.
Yang and Casali [21]demonstrate that there is a cross
linkage between ethics and law, and this nexus reflects
the reality of laws issuing from a societal process that
identifies and validates collectively the perceived minimum standards in a society, that then become the formal
responsibility of government to protect. Arguably, behaviors that have been converted into legislation and then
executively reinforced contribute to the pool of societally
agreed acceptable standards. These represent in a given
era the minimum standards that are not negotiable and
must be viewed as core principles [35,36]. The main
purpose of the legislative process is to shift those principles from the very least influential government role (Endorser) to the areas where the government can have intensive and direct influence as Mandator, in order to impose those principles on firms in a powerful way. The
law-ethics nexus thus represents a crucial space within
which governments may manoeuvre to enhance the status
and nature of CSR within society’s ontological base.
Yet, government influence may lack power over all
those actions that have not yet reached the grey area and
that remain more a potentiality or “wish list” than an imperative or “must have list”. Examples of principles in
the wish list are: proactive action in environment proiB
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tection, workplace safety, customer interest, and responsiveness to stakeholder concerns [21].
An example in 2008 of government as endorser was
provided by the Prime Minister of Australia, Kevin Rudd,
who asked the major Australian banks to pass on interest
rate cuts to the consumer in full, emphasizing the fact that
this would constitute a more ethical way to do business
[37]. Despite political exhortation, there was no supporting legislation, or any tax benefits that would encourage
the banks to behave in this way. The govern- ment was
only endorsing a code of conduct that rested on a key
principle: that the main purpose in cutting interest rates
should be to reduce the burden of financial pressure on
the consumer. It is not intended to increase bank pro- fits
by reducing the price of resources (money)—that is,
“profiteer at the expense of customers” (ibid.).
The above suggests that government as endorser is in a
weak position to influence CSR in terms of intensity and
salience as compared to the other three types of CSR. It
may be hypothesized that government as mandator is the
strongest, with the other two-government as facilitator
and government as partner occupying a second tier of
intensity and salience. Government as endorser occupies
the bottom tier. All, however, are valuable when deployed in concert so as to produce a balanced outcome:
too much of one, such as government as mandator, might
lead to the “nanny state” syndrome for instance; or an
over-emphasis on low-intensity indirect influence could
result in an ineffectual CSR effort.

3. Case Studies: The US, the EU, Australia
and New Zealand
To understand how China’s food safety system may
benefit from the theoretical-analytical discussion above,
it is important to now turn to a number of empirical case
studies in the developed world where international best
practice may be expected to be found. The Chinese
themselves have recognized that they lag behind in international norms and practices. At the Fifth China Food
Safety Annual Meeting in 2007, China’s Vice Minister of
Health Chen Xiaohong admitted that food safety in China
did not match that of the developed world. Among the
problems he identified were: pollution; low quality of
some food products; inadequate technology, equipment,
and quality testing systems; as well as weaknesses in
food safety management [38].
So what do the experiences of governments in industrialized nations reveal in relation to the hypothesized
governmental role with the four types of CSR? What
lessons do these findings have for China? The first is a
brief case study from the United States where new comprehensive methods are used. The second derives from
the European Union whose legislative strengths are especially pertinent to China’s own regulatory instincts, and
Copyright © 2009 SciRes
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the final investigation turns to Australia and New Zealand.

3.1 The United States: Comprehensive
Strategies in a Unitary State
The Food Protection Plan (FPP), released by the US Food
and Drug Administration in November 2007, represents
an especially exemplary and up-to-date model in its dual
features. These are its provision of: a) an inte- grated
strategy that incorporates “both food safety and food defense for domestic and imported products”; and b) collaborative engagement “across the agency to address the
three core elements of protection: prevention, inter- vention and response” [39]. It is in these collaborative engagements that the government’s role as Mandator, Facilitator, Partner and Endorser in the specific area of food
safety becomes evident—not only with the private sector
but with all stakeholders.
Admittedly, it can only be judged by the short timeframe of its existence. Still, an overview of the first six
months of its activities is available. In terms of prevention, outreach activities are prominent and these approximate the government as facilitator and partner models:
“This outreach has involved multiple meetings with
various foreign countries, state and local organizations,
and industry and consumer groups… Specific risk-based
prevention activities include FDA working in collaboration with states, universities and industry on a Tomato Safety Initiative. In an effort to increase foreign
capacity and FDA’s presence beyond our borders, FDA
has engaged with India and begun implementation of
the China Memorandum of Agreement. The first bilateral meeting with China was held in Beijing in March
2008” [39].
The second core element of protection, intervention,
has seen an increase in the number of state inspections
and employees to conduct them. Here is a case of government as mandator. The legal regulatory element is
evident but it is balanced by qualitative improvements in
identifying “food safety threats at the border”; for example, the piloting of a new system called PREDICT. To
coordinate developments such as these a research committee has been tasked with maintaining a “collaborative
research agenda that supports activities under prevention,
intervention and response, such as mitigation strategies
and rapid detection systems” [39].
The third pillar of protection is response. Herein lies
the government as endorser role, for the key group identified for improved response is that of stakeholders. It is they
who are deemed to “be able to quickly identify where a
contaminated product came from and where it has been
distributed”. Under development is so-called Incident
Command System training and Rapid Response Teams
“to enable rapid, localized response to incidents” [39].
iB
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3.2 The European Union: Codifier and
Governance Coordinator
Europe provides a ready laboratory for recent food scandals and governmental responses. In June 1999, it was
found that egg, pork, veal, beef, milk, cheese and butter
products in Belgium were contaminated with dioxin. The
owners of the Belgian company, where the problem was
first traced, were suspected of knowingly fabricating or
buying from Dutch suppliers feed grain mixed with cheap,
second-hand oil or fat that turned out to be con- taminated with dioxin. The tainted feed was sold to 1,400
producers in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Authorities of the European Union, based in Brussels, criticized the Belgian government for taking months to inform the EU about the problem once discovered [40].
This case not only highlights the public-private sector
relationship in CSR but levels of government-to-government communication and influence. Codex Alimentarius
Commission as the highest international body on global
food standards represents a higher governance level than
government as mandator within the unitary state. The
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World
Health Organization (WHO) Codex Alimentarius Commission met in Rome in mid-1999 to respond to the
European crisis over dioxin-contaminated animal products. The Commission set up an intergovernmental task
force to accelerate the adoption of a Draft Code of Practice on Good Animal Feeding. It also approved the establishment of an intergovernmental task force to speed up
the elaboration of guidelines and standards for foods derived from biotechnology; and passed new international
guidelines that clearly defined the nature of organic food
production to prevent misleading claims. The new guidelines covered the production, processing, labeling, and
marketing of organic food [41].
“Mad cow disease” was perhaps the most publicized of
the European food scandals in recent time. It was related
to the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and its
human form, Creutzfeldt-Jakob (nvCJD) disease. The
press release from the FAO on 26 January 2001 warned
that the risk of BSE and its human form posed a risk
worldwide and not only in Europe. The FAO also noted
that all countries which imported cattle or meat and bone
meal (MBM) from Western Europe, especially the UK,
during and since 1980s, could be considered at risk from
the disease [42].
The BSE and nvCJD issue once again showed that
food scandals are closely associated with international
trade and this is an area in which government as mandator has been less effective than the national level. In the
aftermath of the issue, international actors such as FAO
and WHO Codex Alimentarius engaged in a study on a
“Code of Practice for Good Animal Feeding” to ensure
that animal products do not pose health risks to consumCopyright © 2009 SciRes

ers. Consultations were wide-ranging and included the
European Union, Australia, Canada and the United States.
This is a case suggestive of global governance as endorser to influence national governments to become
Mandators of CSR to the food industry, to assist in its
task; the FAO introduced an internet based information
service that included a rapid alert system on food safety
issues [43].
3.2.1 White Paper on Food Safety
In the aftermath of the BSE and dioxin food scandals, the
EU published its “White Paper on Food Safety” (12
January 2000). It should be noted that at the time when
the EU faced alarming food scandals, the EU was the
world’s largest producer of food and beverage products
and this industry was the third largest industrial employer
of the EU with over 2.6 million employees, of which
30% were in small and medium enterprises [44].
The white paper proposed a “radical new approach”
for food safety in Europe. Like the recent US Food Protection Plan, food safety policy would be comprehensive
and integrated in its conception. To this end, an independent European food authority was proposed.
3.2.2 Formation of a Food Safety Authority
The Commission stated that an independent European
food authority would be entrusted with “scientific advice
on all aspects relating to food safety, operation of rapid
alert systems, communication and dialogue with consumers on food safety and health issues as well as networking with national agencies and scientific bodies” and
it would serve an analytical function but only the European Commission would decide on what action to take.
The food authority’s fundamental principles would be
independence, excellence and transparency [44]. A wide
range of other legislative measures were proposed covering all aspects of food products from “farm to ta- ble”.
The legislation was aimed to be easily under- standable
for all operators to put into effect. It gave “teeth” to an
otherwise weak government as endorser function. The
EU as a supranational government is showing the way
forward in terms of governmental in- fluence combining
Mandator with Endorser.
Like the American example above, stakeholder values
were upheld by the white paper’s proposed actions to
keep consumers well informed about newly emerging
food safety concerns and to involve them in food safety
policy. The white paper also had implications for trade
partners of the EU which, in its position as a massive
importer and exporter of food products, must play an
“active role” in international bodies and be effective in
explaining the European position on food safety [44].
The outcomes of the action plan were the integration of
food safety policies within the EU countries and—to an
extent—the EU’s trade partners, as well as a more coordinated system. Transparency at all levels of food safety
iB
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policy stands out as a key principle. Relating to BSE legislation, the white paper identified the problem of inconsistency in approach. In addition, the adoption of measures did not involve all EU institutions. In order to address the integration needs within the single market of the
EU, a new approach was proposed for farming, food
processing, handling and distribution.
As a result of the proposals, the European Food Safety
Authority (see website EFSA, 2008a [45]) was set up
based on Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European
Parliament and of the Council, on 28 January 2002, as an
independent source of scientific advice and communication on risks associated with the food chain [46].
The lessons from the EU on government strategies for
CSR in the food safety arena are that a combination of
the top and bottom tier (legal Mandator and ethical Endorser) works best. The ethical (independence from government, transparency, and stakeholder consultation
which are norms that are being entrenched) is in fact
subsumed within the legal legislative framework through the EU’s unique governance structure. This is a more
codified, yet governance (not government)-based system which sets it apart from nation-states like the US.
The EU, however, shares with the US and the bi-national case study below (Australia and New Zealand) the
philosophy of a comprehensive and coordinated approach. This pertains to a systems approach where the
whole system is examined and activated, rather than selective problem-solving.

3.3 Australia and New Zealand: One System,
Two Countries
Integration and collaboration as twin themes of international best practice in food safety are also evident in the
antipodes. Food Standards Australia New Zealand
(FSANZ) is a bi-national government regulatory agency
whose mission, according to its website is “to provide a
safe food supply and have well-informed consumers”. Its
main responsibility is to develop and administer the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code which is given
legal force through these two countries’ food legislation.
FSANZ as well as other government agencies “monitor
the food supply to ensure that it is safe, and that foods
comply with standards for microbiological contaminants,
pesticide residue limits and chemical contamination” [47].
At the time of the Chinese “tainted milk” scandal,
FSANZ’s website provided updates on Chinese imported
food, including products withdrawn, product testing,
consumer advice and maximum melamine levels in food.
In a coordinated effort with other national and state food
safety agencies, FSANZ engaged in the following actions
[47]: working with importers and local food manufacturers to ascertain if products with Chinese dairy ingredients
Copyright © 2009 SciRes
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are possibly contaminated with melamine; conducting
precautionary testing of products on Australian shelves;
monitoring of imports by the Australian Quarantine and
Inspection Service; and working closely with food regulators around the world including the WHO.
The above is indicative of how the Australasian system responds to a food contamination problem when it
involves imports. China turned to the WHO for help in its
“tainted milk” crisis and more rigorous regulations on
food safety were being introduced [48].
The final section of this article draws lessons for China
from the foregoing two sections on CSR theory and empirical case studies.

4. Lessons for China
4.1 Background to China’s “Tainted Milk”
Scandal
The “tainted milk” scandal broke out in China in September 2008. The Sanlu brand of powdered milk formula
was found to be tainted by the industrial chemical melamine, a binding agent used for plastics and glue but
added to watered-down milk as it mimics protein. The
contamination resulted in the deaths of at least four babies and some 54,000 infants needing medical treatment
that month. The main symptom was kidney stones, for
which 3,458 infants were hospitalized in Beijing alone;
indeed, a survey of 308,000 households in Beijing indicated that a quarter had fed their children the contaminated milk prior to it being removed from the shelves [49].
Melamine was found not only in Sanlu baby for- mula
but a total of 53 dairy brands in China, as well as foreign
brands using Chinese dairy ingredients [50]. This was not
the first food safety incident emanating from China. A
range of goods exported from China, including toothpaste
and pet food, have been found to contain melamine and
other industrial chemicals.
Premier Wen Jiabao responded to the scandal by saying China had to strengthen monitoring at the production
level, as well as instilling a stronger sense of social conscience and business ethics at the management level [51].
So, too, Chinese President Hu Jintao said lessons must be
learned from the milk scandal to “ensure all dairy products sold to the market are qualified products” [52]. By
late October 2008, a draft food safety law was being considered by the National People’s Congress. The law
would seek to a) “prevent any cover-ups by health authorities”—which was said to have occurred in the Sanlu
case in order to avoid a scandal during the Beijing Olympics—and b) would confer on these same govern- ment
health officials direct responsibility for approval of any
additives in processed food [49]. Thus the authorities
would be held responsible for what goes into processed
food as well as for attempts to disguise the outcome.
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4.2 Lessons
Besides a lack of proper governmental oversight and inadequate procedural mechanisms in quality testing, the
“tainted milk” scandal (like other unsafe products in the
past) showed the presence of corrupt business practices
that bypassed China’s quality controls. As noted by deGategno [53]: “China has not succeeded in building effective systems for monitoring and enforcing ethical
standards among its officials. The central government has
and is continuing to implement reforms that make officials increasingly accountable, but they have little control
if no one reports corrupt acts.” It is local officials, according to deGategno, who are key players in food safety
and who need to abide by the rules. Here is a case of
government needing to instill ethical CSR at the level of
businesses and local officials. The strategy to do so requires not only an EU-style government as both Mandator and Endorser, but also more work on the government
as Facilitator and Partner.
The corruption factor has an international dimension.
Ironically, a company from New Zealand—an exemplary
country in terms of food standards regulation and business ethics-was involved in the scandal. Owner of 43% of
the Chinese company at the centre of the scandal, Sanlu,
was New Zealand dairy co-operative Fonterra. It transpired that Fonterra had known of the melamine contamination six weeks before it “raised the alarm” (Sanlu
allegedly had known for eight months) [54,55].
The involvement of Fonterra illustrates the global nature of food manufacturing and the wider governance
responsibility this entails. The EU provides a quality
model for the international dimension of how to codify,
facilitate, communicate and develop a normative environment for food safety in cooperation with other governments and stakeholders. China’s own white paper on
food safety, published in August 2007, reflects a number of these lessons [56], even if they were to no avail for
the victims of the “tainted milk” scandal within a year of
its publication. Such was the impact of this scandal that
the UN published its own report on food safety in China
in October 2008. China needed to modernize its food
safety legislation, overcome ambiguities in supervisory
responsibilities; improve oversight and enforcement; better educate stakeholders—consumers, the food Indus- try
and health authorities; and continue to pursue international standards of best practice. One of the problems in
China was that there were too many small enterprises,
many illegal, to monitor. It is these that are thought responsible for introducing illegal chemicals, with melamine having “apparently ended up in dairy products
after middle men who collected milk from farmers and
sold it to large dairy companies added the chemical” [57].
Approximately 350,000 of China’s 450,000 registered
businesses in food production and processing employ as
Copyright © 2009 SciRes

few as 10 people or less. The UN report blamed these
small enterprises for presenting “many of the greatest
food safety challenges” (ibid.).
Despite the importance of government regulation in the
government as mandator strategy, as discussed in this
article, on its own it is inadequate and requires the other
three types of CSR to combine for greater effectiveness.
The Chinese system was found to be antiquated in that it
was managed by different regulations and an ethos of
government being expected to be responsible for the entire
food system, whereas producers also needed to be
responsible for food safety [58]. To induce greater responsibility on the part of food producers, the activation of
government as facilitator, partner and endorser represents a more comprehensive strategy.
For China, the experiences of others allow it the advantage of being able to leapfrog in the construction of its
own food safety system, so that the “workshop of the
world” can simultaneously lift standards and glean the
best practices the world has to offer on a comparative
basis. That China is traveling this path is evident from the
decision to publish its own white paper on food safety in
2007 to allay fears about the safety of China’s exports,
and other reforms that were underway after the “tainted
milk” scandal in 2008. Already China’s Food and Drug
Administration has been placed under the Min- istry of
Health rather than having the responsibility di- vided
among 16 organizations. Moreover, some companies—Sanlu included—which were previously allowed to
conduct their own quality inspections are no longer permitted to do so [50]. An attempt to change the gov- ernment culture of hiding problems to one of reporting them
promptly is underway through legal measures but also
needs to be strengthened through consumer protect- tion
mechanisms and an enhanced corporate social re- sponsibility.

5. Conclusions
Our study demonstrates that food safety has to be bound
with CSR and the government has a critical role to play
by developing comprehensive strategies to make corporations in food industry behave in a socially responsible way. A number of contributions emerged from our
exploratory study. First, we have extended the CSR literature to the food industry and emerging economies like
China. Second, we have identified the distinctive role the
government plays in the food industry and that government influence on CSR in the food industry is determined by the intensity and salience of its own behavior
and actions. Third, we have provided a timely guide to
establishing a food safety system in China based on empirical evidence that a balanced CSR strategy covering at
least economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic considerations would work best for China.
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